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The caption contains the names of all parties to the 
appeal in the Utah Court of Appeals. The defendant in the trial 
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ment was entered in the trial court, Leucadia Financial Corpora-
tion was substituted for First Security Mortgage Company as the 
defendant. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and (j) and 78-2-2(5) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Court of Appeals correctly interpret the 
standard form Earnest Money Sales Agreement to preclude the 
buyer's right to specific performance? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Association of Realtors adopts the Petitioner's 
statement of the "Nature of the Case" and "Course of Proceedings" 
to the extent it is consistent with the "Statement of the Case" 
contained at pages 1-2 of the Brief of Respondent in Opposition 
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari ("Br. in Opp."). 
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The Utah Association of REALTORS1 (UAR) is a non-
profit corporation consisting of local boards of REALTORS, their 
members, and other licensed real estate professionals in this 
state. Its purposes include maintaining high standards of conduct 
in the real estate profession and exerting effectively a combined 
influence upon matters affecting real estate in this state. (See 
1
 REALTOR is a federally registered collective membership 
mark. 
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Affidavit of L. Alma Mansell (previously filed with the Court), 
15 3 & 4.) 
2. The UAR and its member boards comprise approxi-
mately 3,500 real estate brokers and agents within the state of 
Utah. (Id. S3.) 
3. The UAR is a member of the National Association 
of REALTORS, a national association designed to maintain high 
standards of conduct in the transaction of real estate business 
and to provide a facility for education, research and exchange 
of information for those engaged in the recognized branches of 
the real estate business. (id. f 5.) 
4. The state of Utah, through the Utah Real Estate 
Commission, created pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-5.5 (1953, 
as amended), and the Utah Attorney General, has prepared and 
approved a standard for Earnest Money Sales Agreement ("standard 
form"). The standard form must be used by all licensed real 
estate brokers and salesagents in real estate transactions con-
ducted in this state, as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-20 
(1953, as amended) . The standard form is used in the vast major-
ity of real estate transactions conducted by the members of the 
UAR. (See Affidavit of L. Alma Mansell 5 6.) 
5. On or about February 20, 1987, First Security 
Mortgage Company, as seller, and William R. Kelley, Jr., as buyer, 
executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the purchase and 
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sale of certain residential real property in Park City, Utah. 
(See Record ("R.") at 14-21 •) The agreement was on the standard 
form approved by the Real Estate Commission of the state of Utah 
and the Utah Attorney General. (See Affidavit of L. Alma Mansell, 
App. "A" 16.) 
6. Paragraph N of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
stated, in pertinent part: 
Both parties agree that, should either party 
default in any of the covenants or agreements 
herein contained, the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee, which may arise or 
accrue from enforcing or terminating this 
Agreement, or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by applicable law, whether such 
remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. 
(R. at 17 IN.) 
7. Before closing, a survey disclosed that there 
was a boundary discrepancy. (See R. at 81, 143, 150.) 
8. Also before closing, neighboring property owners 
cut off the water supply to the property, causing a poind on 
the property to dry up, thereby damaging the property. (See R. 
at 45, 50-53, 82.) 
9. The petitioner, Mr. Kelley, brought this action 
seeking a declaration of the parties' respective rights and obli-
gations under the Agreement, specific performance of the Agreement 
and damages for alleged breaches of the Agreement as described 
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above, and also tendered to the court the amount required to 
close the transaction. (See R. at 1-11, 68-71.) 
10. The trial court granted Kelley summary judgment 
on his claim for specific performance. (See R. 562-64.) 
11. First Security accepted Kelley's down payment 
and conveyed the property to Kelley. (See Brief of Respondent, 
No. 880534-CA (Utah Ct. App.), appendix A.) 
12. Thereafter, Leucadia Financial Corporation was 
substituted as defendant for First Security and appealed the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kelley. 
fSee R. 844-49.) 
13. The issues on appeal were whether Kelley made a 
sufficient tender of performance by the closing date and, if 
not, whether the trial court erred in ordering specific perfor-
mance. (See Brief of Appellant, No. 880534-CA (Utah Ct. App.) 
at 1.) 
14. The Utah Court of Appeals did not reach the issues 
concerning Kelley's tender of performance but instead focused 
on paragraph H of the Agreement, regarding the respective rights 
of Buyer and Seller in the event a title defect was discovered. 
Paragraph H reads as follows: 
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is 
elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Broker-
age to order a preliminary commitment for 
a standard form ALTA policy of title insurance 
to be issued by such title insurance company 
as Seller shall designate. Title policy to 
- 4 -
be issued shall contain no exceptions other 
than those provided for in said standard 
form, and the encumbrances or defects excepted 
under the final contract of sale. If title 
cannot be made so insurable through an escrow 
agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, 
unless Buyer elects to waive such defects 
or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and 
this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. 
Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge. 
15. The Court of Appeals concluded that Kelley's remedy 
under paragraph H was limited to a refund of his earnest money 
deposit, not specific performance, because title to the property 
could not be made insurable without exceptions for defects and 
because Kelley refused to waive any title defects. Kelley v. 
Leucadia Fin. Corp., No. 880534-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. 
Jan. 5, 1990). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The interpretation given the standard form Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement by the Utah Court of Appeals improperly 
deprives buyers of their right to specific performance. 
ARGUMENT 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals that Mr. 
Kelley has asked the Court to review was based on that court's 
interpretation of the standard form. The standard form is a 
principal tool of the trade of the UAR's members. The UAR there-
fore has a critical interest in how the standard form is inter-
preted . 
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The UAR feels that, with respect to one significant 
provision of the standard form, paragraph H, the court's inter-
pretation was either wrong or, at best, sufficiently unclear 
so as to cast doubt on the enforceability of the entire form. 
Of utmost concern is the court's apparent interpretation of that 
paragraph which could eliminate the right of a buyer to obtain 
specific performance from the seller. 
This Court has consistently upheld a buyer's right to 
specifically enforce a purchase contract. See, e.g.. Eliason 
v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980); Tanner v. Baadsaaard. 612 
P.2d 345 (Utah 1980); Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977) 
(under analogous facts). Yet, in its interpretation of paragraph 
H, the Court of Appeals has in effect said that, if there are 
title problems or damage to the property, the seller can refuse 
to correct them, and the buyer's only remedy is to waive the 
defect or damage, or walk away from the transaction. Under the 
court's interpretation of paragraph H, the buyer must waive any 
title defects and, of course, also waive any remedy he might 
otherwise have for such defects. Such a result is contrary to 
Utah law. See, e.g.. Castacno v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282, 1284 
(Utah 1976) ("The rule has long been established that a vendee 
has the right to insist upon performance by the vendor to the 
extent the latter is able to perform with an abatement in the 
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purchase price equal to the value of the deficiency or defect") 
(citations omitted). 
In Ace Realty, Inc. v. Loonev, 531 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 
1974), the court found that a contractual provision substantially 
similar to paragraph H of the standard form, was provided for 
the benefit of the buyer rather than the seller. By allowing 
the buyer the right to obtain specific performance from the 
seller, with an abatement for a title defect, the seller would 
appropriately be denied the ability to defeat unilaterally a 
contract by refusing to correct a title defect. 
Beyond the policy considerations associated with denying 
the seller the right to defeat a contract as stated in Ace Realty, 
Inc. v. Looney, 531 P.2d at 1381, there is the language in para-
graph H of the standard form which reads, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions 
other than those provided for in said standard form, 
and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the 
final contract of sale. If the title cannot be made 
so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, 
the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive 
such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, 
and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. 
(R. at 15 (emphasis added).) 
In summary fashion the Court of Appeals apparently 
found that title could not be made insurable through an escrow 
at closing. See Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., No. 880534-CA, 
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slip op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1990). The facts relevant 
to that issue were never developed in the trial court. 
An escrow at closing which adjusts the purchase price 
or reduces closing proceeds to the seller, is a very common and 
practical means of correcting a title defect. However, whether 
through an escrow at closing a seller could cure a title defect 
by means of an adjustment in the purchase price, is an appropriate 
factual question for a trial court to consider in a suit for 
specific performance. The record below reveals no such finding, 
which the UAR believes is vital. 
The UAR believes that the Court of Appeals' inter-
pretation of paragraph H is overly restrictive. The opinion 
does not suggest or intimate that under certain facts, specific 
performance with an abatement would be available as a remedy to 
a buyer. On the contrary, the opinion suggests that the only 
remedy ever available to a buyer under paragraph H, is to waive 
the defect or cancel the transaction. The condition precedent 
to that waiver or cancellation, e.g., that the title be un-
insurable through an escrow at closing, was not expressly dis-
cussed or analyzed by the court. 
The Court of Appeals' interpretation of paragraph H 
to deny Kelley specific performance in effect read paragraph N 
out of the standard form. Paragraph N allows a party to bring 
suit to enforce the agreement if the other party defaults in 
- 8 -
any of the covenants or agreements contained in the standard 
form. The failure of a seller to convey clear title constitutes 
a default by the seller of its covenant to furnish "good and 
marketable title.H Thus, under paragraph N, Kelley was entitled 
to bring an action to specifically enforce the agreement. If 
the consequence of his election to enforce the agreement under 
paragraph N meant that, under paragraph H, he was required to 
waive any title defect, then the court could tailor its order 
of specific performance accordingly. But that was never an issue 
before the Court of Appeals because First Security settled 
Kelley's claim that he was entitled to damages for First 
Security's failure to convey clear title. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals' decision has serious implications 
for the real estate industry. Buyers consistently use the stan-
dard form to obtain loans to finance their purchases. If the 
interpretation of the standard form is unclear or if that form 
cannot be specifically enforced, as the Court of Appeals has 
implied, then real estate transactions using the standard form 
become uncertain, and lenders and the parties to the transactions 
cannot rely on the standard for as a binding contract. 
Mr. Kelley filed this action to preserve whatever rights 
he may have had under the standard form. Yet merely by filing 
this action, under the Court of Appeals' decision, he lost his 
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right to purchase the property. Thus, the Court of Appeals' 
decision punishes buyers who seek the aid of a court to declare 
and enforce their rights under the standard form.2 
For the foregoing reasons, the UAR believes that the 
Court should reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this ( I day of December, 1990. 
D. FRANK WILKINS, Esq, 
DAVID W. JOHNSON, Esq, 
(Original signature) 
2 The UAR takes no position on whether, under the facts 
of this case, First Security breached the agreement and whether 
Kelley was in fact entitled to damages. The parties' settlement 
of Kelley's damage claim moots those issues. But the UAR be-
lieves that the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the stan-
dard form so as to deny specific performance to a buyer merely 
because he insisted on enforcing rights he thought he had under 
that form. 
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